



Connect

Confidential Computing

with Red Hat OpenShift: concepts, use cases and roadmap

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What is confidential compute



Protecting data

Existing Encryption



Data At Rest

Data Encryption and System Attestation

- ▶ Protect Data on Disk using LUKS and Network Bound Disk Encryption (NBDE)
- ▶ Attest system state on boot, ensuring that system packages have not been compromised with IMA and Keylime
- ▶ Attest container workloads with Key Brokering Service (KBS)
- ▶ Ensure data remains unreachable in case of unauthorized access to the storage



Data In Transit (EU) / in Motion

Encrypt Traffic Leveraging Strong, Future Proof Cryptography

- ▶ Protect data moving through the environment using strong, smart and validated cryptography
- ▶ Centralized management and establishment of secured connections native part of workflow for Red Hat Platform
- ▶ Automation provided allows consistent deployment and security configuration

New



Data In Use

Confidential Computing Use Trusted Execution Environment Capabilities

- ▶ Protect data and workloads in use with Trusted Execution Environments as Confidential Computing is enabled on the major hardware platforms for AMD, Intel and NVIDIA
- ▶ Leverage these Trusted Execution Environments on prem or in the major cloud platforms
- ▶ Increases the security level of organizations that manage sensitive and regulated data



Why ?


- ▶ Regulation and move to the cloud
 - Example: Digital Operational Resilience Act
 - *Financial entities shall ... maintaining high standards of security, confidentiality and integrity of data, **whether at rest, in use or in transit.***
- ▶ Volatility in the markets and its effect.
 - Moving applications from one environment to the next.
 - Digital Sovereignty, Zero Trust and Confidential Computing



A test drive in memory forensics

```
my_super_secret_password=redhat123!  
export my_super_secret_password  
env  
/bin/sleep 9999 # start child process
```

```
virtctl memory-dump get memory-dump --create-claim ...
```



A test drive in memory forensics



```
$ vol -f memory.dump linux.pslist
```

```
0x8d47c1a6c780 1 1 0 systemd 0 0 0 0 2025-09-09 07:17:53.068616 UTC Disabled
0x8d47c1a68000 2 2 0 kthreadd 0 0 0 0 2025-09-09 07:17:53.068616 UTC Disabled
0x8d47c1a6a3c0 3 3 2 pool_workqueue_ 0 0 0 0 2025-09-09 07:17:53.069616 UTC Disabled
0x8d47c1a923c0 4 4 2 kworker/R-rcu_g 0 0 0 0 2025-09-09 07:17:53.069616 UTC Disabled
0x8d47c1a94780 5 5 2 kworker/R-sync_ 0 0 0 0 2025-09-09 07:17:53.069616 UTC Disabled
...
0x8d47c9e44780 1518 1518 1517 bash 1000 1000 1000 1000 2025-09-09 07:18:22.687829 UTC Disabled
...
0x8d47cbb7c780 1773 1773 1518 sleep 1000 1000 1000 1000 2025-09-09 08:13:11.465208 UTC Disabled
```



A test drive in memory forensics



```
$ vol -f memory.dump linux.bash.Bash
```

```
...
```

```
1518 bash 2025-09-09 07:20:41.000000 UTC export my_super_secret_password
```

```
1518 bash 2025-09-09 07:20:41.000000 UTC my_super_secret_password=redhat123!
```

```
1518 bash 2025-09-09 07:20:41.000000 UTC env
```

```
1518 bash 2025-09-09 08:13:12.000000 UTC /bin/sleep 9999
```



A test drive in memory forensics



```
$ vol -f memory.dump linux.envvars --pid 1773
```

```
....
```

```
1773 1518 sleep SHELL /bin/bash  
1773 1518 sleep HISTCONTROL ignoredups  
1773 1518 sleep HISTSIZE 1000  
1773 1518 sleep HOSTNAME memory-dump  
1773 1518 sleep PWD /home/cloud-user  
1773 1518 sleep LOGNAME cloud-user  
1773 1518 sleep XDG_SESSION_TYPE tty  
1773 1518 sleep my_super_secret_password redhat123!
```




What is confidential computing

Confidential Computing (CC) is the protection of **data in use** by performing the computation in a **hardware-based, attested Trusted Execution Environment**, according to the [Confidential Computing Consortium's definition](#).

The three primary attributes of a Trusted Execution Environment are **data integrity, data confidentiality, and code integrity**.



How?



Hidden from the Operating System and Kernel inside a **Trusted Execution Environment**. Access only through special API.



Hardware implementations

- ▶ AMD SEV SNP: Confidentiality on a Core based VM and on the Memory
- ▶ Intel SGX (core based) and TDX (VM)
- ▶ IBM z HyperProtect + Secure Execution
- ▶ ARM CCA
- ▶ AWS Nitro
- ▶ RISC-V (in progress)



Confidential computing organizations


Confidential Computing Consortium (CCC) - 2019

<https://confidentialcomputing.io>




OpenInfra Foundation

Kata Containers




Cloud Native Computing Foundation (CNCF)



CONFIDENTIAL
CONTAINERS



3 projects with OpenShift



Customer/Cloud Provider

Confidential context - Guest Owner



Attestation

What is attestation ?

Attestation is a **cryptographic process** that allows a trusted execution environment (TEE) to **prove to a remote party** that it **is running on genuine hardware and with the expected software and configuration**, ensuring the integrity and confidentiality of the data and workload.




Attestation

- ▶ Architectural decision: all content in a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) coming from the outside which is encrypted
 - data / container images / kubernetes secrets / storage
- ▶ This key is provided through Attestation making it Security by Design
- ▶ Local attestation
 - Cloud provider is providing an attestation service
 - cloud provider and the attestation provider are in the same company
- ▶ Remote attestation
 - attestation service is not located within (or administered by) the cloud provider
 - better protection



Flow of attestation



Red Hat Build of Trustee

- ▶ Trustee = open source project to implement attestation service
- ▶ Red Hat Build of Trustee to add Enterprise support.
- ▶ Is deployed as an operator on an OpenShift System
- ▶ Comes with OpenShift Container Platform or OpenShift Platform Plus subscription



Trusted Computing Base

- ▶ A trusted computing base (TCB)
 - all hardware, firmware, and software components of a computer system that are critical to its security.
 - Bugs, vulnerabilities jeopardize the security of the entire system
- ▶ In the context of confidential containers: Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), the confidential container itself, and the minimal software running inside it.
- ▶ In the context of attestation: The attestation service needs to run in a TCB.
 - chicken and egg problem



Root of trust

- ▶ Typically on-prem datacenter
 - Presumed to be the most secure, best control over this environment
 - Also contains the key management system
- ▶ Trusted single use platform
 - Laptop
 - Used to start initial attestation source and start the chain of trust
- ▶ Trusted third party attestation provider
 - Service provider you trust implicitly




Separation of responsibilities

- ▶ Cloud Provider
 - Can be forced to provide access to the data through regulations
- ▶ Hardware Provider
 - Intel, AMD, ...
- ▶ Attestation Provider
 - Provides attestation services and has access to Key Management Services.
- ▶ Software Provider
 - Provides the Software to create and run the Confidential Container and provide the Attestation Software
 - Red Hat OpenShift and Build of Trustee in our case
- ▶ Client
 - Always assumed secure as for the customer
- ▶ **To break through the security mechanisms you need roles to collaborate (cloud provider + other)**



Separation of responsibilities


- ▶ Attack vector: The Hardware providers participates.
 - CPU is not started in Conf.Mode but provides evidence to convince Attestation service to provide key.
- ▶ Attack vector: The Attestation provider participates.
 - CPU is not started in Conf.Mode and the provides non confidential evidence. But Attestation service provides access to the key anyway.
- ▶ The Software if it is open source it can be externally verified not to include backdoors.
- ▶ The attestation service should be deployed in the companies TCB.
 - **=> Unique to Red Hat**



Use cases




Use case: Dynamic Secure Cloud Bursting



public cloud acting as a consumption based flexible extension of the on premise Datacenter.



Use case: Dynamic Secure Cloud Bursting




Demo-ed using KEDA (Kubernetes event-driven autoscaler)

<https://www.redhat.com/en/blog/secure-cloud-bursting-leveraging-confidential-computing-peace-mind>




Use case: Dynamic Secure Cloud Bursting

- ▶ Integrating the execution of the AI model into a Confidential Computing context.
- ▶ The GPU is external to the CPU
 - Modern GPUs support TEE
 - Requires multipart attestation (roadmap)




Use cases: edge integration (public cloud, roadmap)



Securing privacy data from external access in an edge device.



Use cases: partner interaction (public cloud, roadmap)



Interaction of different partners to exchange information for example for a federated learning scenario but aren't willing to share the business data.

Centralized component which restricts outside interaction.

With Confidential Container no participant has access to training data.




Use cases: The inner sanctum (on-premise)

Segregating access of


- ▶ Infrastructure Administrators
- ▶ Cluster Administrators
- ▶ Workload Administrators

establishing Inner Sanctum Admin Group to restrict access to Confidential Computing Services like Attestation and KMS.

Implementation of 4 eye principle to get physical access.



Use cases: IP/integrity protection (on-premise)



A supplied component is running inside a customers infrastructure to provide services.

The supplier wants to ensure that the software used in this cannot be accessed by a customer.

Example: robot in a factory.



Summary




Summary

- ▶ **Confidential Computing (CC)** allows to **protect data in use**
- ▶ The computation in a hardware-based **Trusted Execution Environment**
- ▶ **Attestation** allows to prove that it is **running on genuine hardware and with the expected software and configuration**
- ▶ Red Hat provides the **Red Hat Build of Trustee** for attestation
- ▶ Run the attestation service in a trusted environment
- ▶ **Remote attestation** and **open source software** makes this more secure
- ▶ 3 projects => see next slide



3 projects with OpenShift



Customer/Cloud Provider

Confidential context - Guest Owner





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Thank you



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